“If we are after advancing political jurisprudence, answering modern questions and meeting contemporary needs we must pay especial attention to methodological discussions”, he said, while answering a question by Rahaward Electronic Journal on methodology and its definition.
“One can look at methodology from two perspectives. One is traditional and classic according to which methodology is a part of logic or philosophy. It is a systematic and precise study of a set of principles that dominate a specific science and lead it through out. According to this view, methodology is the knowledge of methods. In other words, the subject matter of methodology according to this view is method itself. The basic aim of methodology being a part of Aristotelian logic being taught in seminaries is to identify these principles in the form of form and matter”, said this faculty member of Shahid Behishti University.
“Another view is new and modern according to which methodology is a part of philosophy of science – not a part of philosophy. Based on this approach, methodology is a scientific discipline. It is independent in some respects while dependent on philosophy of science in others. Its task is to describe and analyze methods used in sciences”, he maintained.
“If we are after describing, analyzing and explaining methods used in different sciences we are in search of something called ‘methodology’”, he pointed out.
“Sometimes normative approaches in this second approach get mixed with descriptive approach while at other times this approach is merely descriptive or analytic. Some, after identifying and analyzing the methods, try to evaluate and pass judgments concerning them, rejecting some and recommending others in sciences. However some sciences do not accept these norms”, he mentioned.
“According to the second approach, the subject matter changes. Since ‘method’ is not the subject matter of methodology therefore methodology is not a first ranking knowledge. Methodology is a science that deals with methods and ways. Its aim is thus to identify methods and ways used in sciences. This is a general definition of methodology”, he stated.
“Based on the second approach, methodology aims at three things. Firstly it identifies ways and methods used in scientific researches, theorizations and in general in a science that is the subject of our discussion”, he pinpointed.
“The second aim is accordingly to identify the methodological principles a theorist relies on. The presupposition of this point is that every intellectual organizes his thought on the bases of a specific set of theoretical principles. Thus every theory is based on certain principles. If we want to find out the methodological principles of an intellectual and know on what principles he has organized his thought we can do so through methodology as it is methodology that can help us in this regard”, he maintained.
“The third aim is more important. There are different schools of thought in different sciences. There might be various schools of thoughts in every single scientific school of thought. One of the important grounds of the differences of these schools of thoughts lies in their methodology and methodological principles. If we want to find out the methodological principles of these schools of thoughts studying their differences from the perspective of methodological principles, we must focus on methodology as a factor that helps us in this regard. Methodology helps us find out the methodological principles of scientific schools of thoughts. The development of scientific schools of thoughts is indebted to the recognition of these methodological principles. Thus as a third point, methodology gives these services”, he said.
“According to the first outlook, methodology helps you from within to understand the laws and principles that rule a specific kind of theorization. However the outer advantages you get through other approaches are not available in this approach. If we take this point as a principle we can say that methodology can have the same uses in jurisprudence particularly in political jurisprudence”, director of political jurisprudence of research center of political sciences and theories said.
“Just as methodology in general is looked at from two angles so is the methodology of jurisprudence and political jurisprudence. If we move in accordance with the first outlook considering methodology as a part of philosophy and logic we must say that jurisprudential methodology or methodology of political science is a systematic and precise study of the principles that rule over juridical activities or in other words, the principles that rule over ijtihad”, he mentioned.
“Methodology guides into the principles and laws that govern a specific branch of science. Based on methodological studies, we can make our way into the inner dimensions of these principles. The application of methodology is quite similar to what is said in seminary books related to the principles of jurisprudence. When a seminary student studies the science of the principles of jurisprudence he naturally gets into the laws and principles that govern jurisprudence and ijtihad. The knowledge he acquires is of the sort of first ranking. However this definition is seldom noted”, this seminary and university professor told.
“This has motivated some scholars of jurisprudence and political jurisprudence to pay attention from a second angle to methodology of jurisprudence and political jurisprudence and its various uses. Based on this approach, methodology is a branch of philosophy of jurisprudence or philosophy of political jurisprudence, tasked to describe and analyze ways and methods used in jurisprudence and political jurisprudence. However this will be a general definition of methodology of jurisprudence or political jurisprudence”, professor Mir Ahmadi said.
“Thus methodology is a science that tells you about ways and methods with which jurisprudence and political jurisprudence are concerned and on the bases of which they deduce religious rulings that are related either to public life or to political life. The explanation, description and analysis of methods are what is called jurisprudential methodology or methodology of political jurisprudence”, he further elaborated.
“The first advantage of methodology is knowing about ways and methods that are used in a science, which in our current discussion is political jurisprudence. How and on the bases of what methodologies does political jurisprudence theorize? If we are to name this methodology, we will call it generally ‘ijtihad’, the existing method in jurisprudence”, he underlined.
“We must mention here that methodology helps us to discover the opinions presented by jurists, especially those who have exercised ijtihad in the field of politics or in other words those who have in fact exercised political ijtihad. What are the bases of theories of political systems? For example, what are the methodological principles of the one who proves the theory of Valayat e Faqih on the basis of his own ijtihad? What are the methodological principles of the one who on the other hand limits the authority of Vali e Faqih? The differences that are existing among jurists are to some extent originate in their methodological principles”, Hujjatulislam Mir Ahmadi pointed out.
“Today we observe the emergence of different jurisprudential schools of thought and political jurisprudence. There are, for example, Qom and Najaf schools of thought in Shiite jurisprudence today, just as there were Qom and Baghdad schools of thought in the past. These schools of thoughts have naturally their own methodological principles. This is methodology that helps us identify these methodological principles”, this Baqir al-Ulum professor said.
According to traditional approach ijtihad is unchangeable.
Answering a question on how he evaluated the development of juridical deduction from the perspective of Shiite jurists, he said, “some are of the view that there is no development in juridical deduction or ijtihad as the occurrence of development in such an area is not possible. However there are other approaches that agree with the occurrence of change and development in juridical deduction”.
Referring to the first approach, he maintained, “the first approach is a traditional approach that existed in the past influencing to some extent our juridical tradition. According to this approach, Islamic rulings can never be changed with the change of time or place. In other words, it assumes that ijtihad and juridical deduction are not changeable as ijtihad and juridical deduction are based on certain laws and principles that are not changeable. Based on this view, today we need the same laws and principles for ijtihad we needed in fourth and fifth Hijra centuries. This is because the laws and principles of ijtihad are unchangeable. Thus in accordance with this approach, we cannot talk of ‘development in juridical deduction in ijtihad’ and if there is any change and development at all it is in the quantity of religious rulings not in the principles of ijtihad as they are unchangeable”.
“On the contrary, there is a modernist approach that stands opposed to the traditional approach. According to this approach, Islamic rulings change with the change of time and place and the changes that occur with subjects in different times and places. As a result, it is possible for Islamic rulings to undergo changes as a result of temporal and spatial changes. Thus ijtihad and juridical deduction have to keep in mind the requirements of time and place”, he stressed.
“If a jurist is going to deduce a religious ruling compatible with the occurred changes, it is necessary for him to pay attention to temporal and spatial conditions making the recognition of time and place as the beginning of his ijtihad”, he maintained.
“According to this approach, traditional ijtihad is no doubt necessary but not sufficient. The laws and principles of traditional ijtihad are necessary. However if a jurist (who is already acquainted with the laws of traditional ijtihad) wants to move in accordance with modern needs and meet these needs he must know time and place very well. He must know about the needs arising in different times and places so that he is able to deduce religious rulings in accordance with these needs. This is seemingly where the need for ijtiahd emerges”, he said.
“This approach believes in a limited change. In other words, it agrees with change in ijtihad but says that the change is to be within the framework of traditional ijtihad. Though the general structure of ijtihad and their laws and principles are unchangeable, there are certain changes that take place within ijtihad, making it thus a dynamic system. If ijtihad does not allow changes to take place within it, it cannot move side by side with march of time. As an instance, Imam Khomeini’s ijtihad is the same as that of Sheikh Mufid in terms of using similar rules and principles. However they differ in that the former agrees with change while the latter does not. When jurisprudence was not aware of modern concepts even in the time of Constitutional Revolution, it used to move within the framework of traditional approach. However when jurisprudence came into contact with new concepts such as law, freedom, equality, constitutionalism, people’s Rule, republicanism, democracy etc. during and after the constitutional Revolution, it began to develop in accordance with them. In other words, it is after contact with such new concepts that ijtihad becomes dynamic”, he said.
“If a contemporary scholar disagrees with this point of view and refutes the necessity of dynamic ijtihad, he subscribes to the first approach even though he lives in the present era”, he warned.
“There is also a third approach that is different from the second approach (modern approach). When applied in other areas, it is called ‘modernist approach’. It is influenced by modern theories and methods of humanities. When new sciences found their ways into Iranian scholarly circles, their theories and methodologies began to clash with jurisprudence and in particular with political jurisprudence. As a result a new approach began to emerge”, professor Mir Ahmadi remarked.
“There are also different approaches in hermeneutics. Philosophical hermeneutics tries to show how understanding takes place. If the third approach makes use of this hermeneutical trend its implications will be much more compared to the second approach. Based on discourse approach, ijtihad is not a continued process rather it is a discontinued process. Looking at ijtihad from the perspective of discourse, we will not have one continued line of ijtihad, rather we will have many separated ijtihads.
Discourse is based on discontinuity in thought. If we look at ijtihad from the angle of discourse we will not have then a traditional ijtihad or what is known as a Jawahiri ijtihad. Even if we apply philosophical hermeneutics things will change for the better, for philosophical hermeneutics allows, as one of its most important principle, the intervention of presuppositions and pre-acquired knowledge in textual understanding”.
“Based on this view, a mujtahid’s presuppositions and pre-acquired knowledge deeply influence his understanding of a text. His understanding will be historical and historicity will play a role in his understanding of a text. Thus what is available here is change and development and what we are faced with is again change and development in ijtihad, which are caused by change, and development in presuppositions and pre-acquired knowledge. Thus according to this new approach, change is more profound and complicated compared to the previous view”, he noted.
Saying that here the change occurred outside the boundary of ijtihad, he pointed out, “on the second approach, change occurs within the framework of ijtihad, with the rules that govern ijtihad while on the basis of this new approach change takes place outside the framework of ijtihad. Now if we take into consideration all these approaches, we will come to know that according to the first approach ijtihad is static while according to the second outlook ijtihad is dynamic. That is to say in accordance with the second approach, though ijtihad as a whole is unchangeable, there are certain changes that take place within the framework of ijtihad. This is while according to the third view discontinuity is looked at as change. Since many changes occur during different periods therefore the ijtihad of one period is quite different from that of another period”, he explained.
Referring to the second approach, he stressed, “on this outlook, ijtihad changes from within. In order to comply with outer needs, the inner mechanisms of ijtihad undergo changes. If the aim of ijtihad is to accord between unchangeable religious laws with the changing world then ijtihad is a mechanism that does the act of according. It accords unchangeable religious laws with the changes that take place in the world”.
Referring to the third approach, he mentioned, “according to the third outlook the factors responsible for changes are not linked with the change in ijtihad or ijtihad mechanism. The changes are either due to the changes occurred in the past or due to the changes occurred with presuppositions, pre-acquired knowledge and mentalities of mujtahid. In other words, here we switch our look from ijtihad to factors that lie outside the boundary of ijtihad”.
“There is no one among the present jurists who belongs to this approach, though there are many famous jurists who belong to the second category. It is possible for the jurists who have subscribed to the second view, to have some divergence of opinions. For example, Imam Khoneini who belongs to the second approach presents the theory of valayat e faqih while certain Ayatollah Shams al-Din from Lebanon who also belongs to the same trend, presents the theory of valayat et umma. However they both have a modernist approach towards ijtihad. The first subscriber to the third approach in Iran can be Mujtahid Shabistari. He was the first who tried to study ijtihad using the tool of philosophical hermeneutics. Later on this view was more publicized”.
Discussions concerning discourse, hermeneutics and methodology influence jurisprudential discussions.
“The discussions related to discourse, hermeneutics and modern methodology influence jurisprudential discussions. We can make use of modern scholarly discussions (such as discourse and hermeneutics) to the extent that they increase ijtihad capacities. In other words, modernist or dynamic ijtihad makes use of the potentials existing at different times in order to strengthen its own potentials and capacities. If the aim of ijtihad is to accord fixed religious laws to the changing world it must change with the change of the world as the world is continuously changing. As a result, political jurisprudence, just like political science, must be flexible and changeable, as political life is changeable. If ijtihad is to harmonize itself with changing politics it has to make use of these new capacities and potentials at different times”, he further stressed.
“Hermeneutics may have certain capacities that might help ijtihad once it is equipped with them. However studies show that none of these newly discovered methods can be a substitute for ijtihad especially its Shiite version. What we want in following discussions pertaining to discourse is to find out potentials and capacities that can be used in ijtihad. Otherwise none of these methods can be independently used in political jurisprudence”, he mentioned.
Citing an example he mentioned, “there are many questions in political jurisprudence that need to be answered: Does political jurisprudence recognize a democratic system? Does political jurisprudence recognize mechanisms available in a democratic system? Does it allow Muslims to form a party? Does it recognize political freedoms? What are the domains of these freedoms from the perspective of political jurisprudence? Similarly there are many debatable questions in the realm of women’s rights, minority rights, children rights, environment and in particular globalization. If we want to answer this host of questions from the perspective of political jurisprudence, we naturally need to strengthen political jurisprudence. If we want to strengthen political jurisprudence we must start it from methodology. As long as you have not strengthened its methodology, you cannot present useful politico-juridical theories compatible with modern requirements. The aim of political jurisprudence in the past was to deduce religious rulings specifying the political duties of qualified agents. However if we want to consider political jurisprudence as a systematic science that organizes political lives and on which a political system can be based, political jurisprudence then naturally cannot suffice to deducing religious rulings; in addition to making such deduction, it must work out laws and regulations upon which political life could be based”, he further said.
“Being as such, political jurisprudence has to attain development, which in turn requires it to attain methodological development. While keeping in mind the basic principles of ijtihad, political jurisprudence must equip itself with modern know-hows if it is going to meet modern needs”, he noted.
In response to a question on factors responsible for the emergence of the third view, he pointed out, “there are two methodological and sociological factors that are perhaps responsible for the emergence of the third view. A sociological factor refers to problems, difficulties and questions that are not answered convincingly or are not taken into consideration at all. Anyhow there are questions that are not answered. This is called sociological factor, that is there are questions in a society but the existing thought system does not answer them”.
“There are certain methodological faults with this view. We must know methodological implications before comparing it to dynamic ijtihad. We must make use of the advantages of these methodologies in order to further improve dynamic ijtihad. However we must be mindful not fall in the trap of their disadvantages. Some one may ask as to whether it is possible to make such a selection. In response to this question, we have to say that all human achievements have certain merits and demerits. If we accept this as a rule, then we can say that the third view is not an exception to this rule. It also has certain advantages and disadvantages or merits and demerits. We must endeavor to make use of its advantages”, he mentioned.
“However if it is proved that modern methodologies carry with them no advantages, certainly no one will insist on choosing or using them. But if it is proved that they have certain advantages and points of strength that can be used for the promotion of ijtihad we do not have any option other than using them within the framework of ijtihad, not outside of it. If we make it subordinate to ijtihad there will be a family resemblance (to use Wittgenstein’s terminology) between this method and other rules and principles used with in ijtihad. There is a sort of unity in multiplicity. There are many rules in ijtihad, but they follow a single purpose”, he clarified.
“There are various kinds of ijtihad. The difference in ijtihad is an acceptable phenomenon, particularly in view with Shiite approach name ‘takhti’a’. however if these differences end up in eliminating the law and principles applied in ijtihad, they are no longer acceptable. Thus when a person wants to borrow for example a hermeneutic rule he must see whether or not it undermines the principles of ijtihad and shakes its foundations. If a borrowed rule does not shake the foundations and instead it multiplies the branches, leaves and fruits, there is no reason why we should not accept it. This is the only option available”, he concluded.
Source: ISCA (office of scientific and international cooperation)